Vincent Pouliot
How can social scientists analyse the nexus between globalization and security without reifying global threats? In the aftermath of 9/11, the notion of a so-called globalization of threats has become standard knowledge, especially in the discipline of International Relations (IR). With the recent wave of globalization, so the argument goes, the domain of international security has qualitatively changed to encompass a host of new global threats that could not even be imagined a few decades ago. Many textbooks on world politics present this view as the new deal of the 21st century and invite undergraduate students to build on such a premise to make sense of global security. Disturbingly, however, the argument that threats are going global is also part of contemporary political discourse, most obviously in George W. Bush's justification for the 'war on terror'. In other words, the academic discourse on the globalization of threats happens to coincide almost perfectly with the rhetorical strategies of certain politicians. As a result, social scientific knowledge and the legitimacy in which it is wrapped carry important normative consequences for globalization and international security.
From a constructivist perspective, in fact, the social scientific snake eats its own tail. If reality and the knowledge that constitutes it are socially constructed, then scientific knowledge too cannot but be yet another social construction. As a result, social science partakes in bringing the world into being, with all the political consequences that this Reflexive Mirror 3S implies. In the subfield of security studies, this creates what Huysmans (2002) dubs 'the normative dilemma of writing security'. This dilemma, which stems from the performative nature of language,! 'consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid': the securitization of new threats (Huysmans 2002:43) . 2 All constructivists agree that threats are not objective facts 'out there' but social constructs characterized by unrelenting political contestation. As a result, linguistic utterances, including scientific ones, always run the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies. Huntington's (1993) 'clash of civilization' is a well-known example of such linguistic performativity and the kind of politics it can generate. Because writing about the globalization of threats amounts to constructing specific forms of knowledge that bring a particular reality into being, it is crucial for students of world politics to tackle the normative dilemma of writing security head-on. For his part, Huysmans (2002:52-53) concludes quite pessimistically that constructivists 'cannot but accept that security enunciations risk the opening of space for successful securitizing practices'. While Huysmans' caution is healthy, this chapter proposes a way to turn security studies into a 'reflexive mirror' of the globalization of threats.
As an epistemological way out of the normative dilemma of writing security, the chapter argues that 'everything takes place as if' threats were going globaJ.3 The 'as if' language conveys the central idea that science needs to be construed as a metaphor of social realities, aiming to provide a reflexive -as opposed to reifying -mirror of social realities. In this epistemology, social science is not in the business of saying what being is but what being resembles (Ringmar, 1997:277) . As a metaphor, social science does not simply reflect social realities but casts them in a reflexive mirror. It puts social worlds into new light. The chapter makes this argument in two parts. The first part deals with the argumentative logic of the globalization of threats and its epistemology. Based on a review of recent literature, the epistemological and normative flaws that plague the notion that threats are 'really' going global 'out there' are exposed. The second part of the chapter offers two epistemological alternatives to positivism: subjectivism and the 'every thingtakes-place-as-if' position. While the subjectivist focuses on the meanings held by international actors as a central plank of the scientific enterprise, it also lacks the objectifying capacity that the scientific posture can potentially deliver. By treating social scientific knowledge as metaphors, one can analyse social realities not in themselves but in terms of what they look like. This stance allows social scientists to dodge the
